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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY OLSEN, by and through his Guardian 
ad Litem, Gaylen R Olsen, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION; THE STATE 
OF UTAH, by and through its ROAD COM-
MISSION; and FLOWELL ELECTRICAL AS-
SOCIATION, INC., a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION; THE STATE 
OF UTAH, by and through its ROAD COM-
MISSION, Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
COX CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC, 
.; Third-Party Defendant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, STATE OF UTAH 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a personal injury action seeking recovery of 
damages for bodily injury suffered in a construction 
accident which occurred in the course of Appellant's 
employment. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Salt Lake County, Honorable 
GL Hal Taylor presiding, granted summary judgment 
in favor of Respondent, Flowell Electrical Association, 
Case No. 
13867 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
no cause of action. Later, the District Court, Honorable 
Maurice Harding presiding, granted summary judgment 
in favor of Respondent, State of Utah, no cause of 
action. 
BELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, State of Utah, seeks affirmance of the 
judgment below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant has failed to accurately and fully 
state the undisputed facts and, therefore, a restatement 
of the facts is necessary. 
This action arose out of an accident that occurred 
on September 6, 1972, near Meadow, Utah, during the 
construction of a section of Interstate Highway 15. 
Appellant, a laborer employed by Cox Construction 
Company, was assisting the pouring of cement on a 
bridge deck from a large steel bucket suspended from 
the cable of a crane when the supporting cables of the 
boom contacted an overhead power line owned by the 
Flowell Electrical Association. An electrical charge of 
14,400 volts was transmitted to the bucket causing serious 
injuries to the Appellant. 
A week prior to the accident, Brent Cox, the super-
intendent of the Cox Construction Company, contacted 
Flowell Electrical officials to review the construction 
site and to make arrangements for de-energizing the 
power line located approximately 29 feet above the bridge 
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deck where the cement pour was to proceed. [Cox Depo-
sition, pp. 13, 21]. Ralph Robinson, a Flowell Electrical 
Association employee, inspected the site and informed 
Cox that the power line serviced several customers and 
requested that, if possible, the pour be arranged to avoid 
interruption of power. [Cox Deposition, pp. 16, 21]. 
Brent Cox advised Robinson that cement could be de-
livered to the site with a concrete pump, rather than a 
crane, thus eliminating the need to terminate power. 
[Cox Deposition, p. 15]. Since the cement pump was to 
be used, no arrangements for terminating power were 
made and Robinson asked Cox to notify the power com-
pany if he "needed any help." [Cox Deposition, p. 15]. 
Cox agreed to notify Flowell if terminating power be-
came necessary. [Cox Deposition, p. 15, 21-22]. 
On the day of the accident, Cox attempted to use a 
concrete pump specifically ordered for the job, but the 
pump failed to function properly. [Cox Deposition, pp. 
30, 31]. Cox ordered the 40 ton crane moved into the area 
while he drove to Fillmore, a distance of approximately 
15 miles, to contact Ralph Robinson to request cutting 
electrical power. [Cox Deposition, p. 32]. He was unable 
to contact Robinson, or any other Flowell employees, and 
he returned without making arrangements with the power 
company. [Cox Deposition, p. 32]. 
In Cox's absence, the employees began using the 
crane to deliver cement to the north side of the bridge 
deck away from the power line. [Cox Deposition, p. 35]. 
A large steel cement bucket suspended by cable from the 
boom was used for this purpose. When Cox returned, he 
3 
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supervised the completion of the pour on the north side 
and then ordered the crane moved to the south side near 
the overhead electrical wire. [Cox Deposition, p. 36]. 
Cox remained on the scene to directly supervise the 
total concrete operation and to observe the movement of 
the crane. [Cox Deposition, p. 37]. Cognizant of the 
nearby electrical wire, he continuously spoke with the 
crane operator concerning the movement of the crane 
boom. [Cox Deposition, p. 68]. The Appellant and a 
fellow employee, Darwin Jensen, positioned the cement 
bucket for each pour by using hand signals. [Cox Deposi-
tion, p. 39], 
Just prior to the accident, Brent Cox instructed the 
Appellant and Jensen to pour one more bucket in the 
same position as the previous load and ordered them not 
to direct the crane boom any closer to the overhead 
power line. [Cox Deposition, pp. 68-70]. The accident 
occurred when the Appellant and his fellow employee 
directed the final bucket of cement into position and the 
crane boom or supporting cable brushed against the high 
voltage wire. 
The only State employee present at the construction 
site at the time of the accident was Franklin Drew Eas-
mussen. The State of Utah by its Road Commission had 
engaged Cox Construction Company for construction of 
this section of interstate highway. Easmussen was a 
laboratory technician assigned to the project to insure 
that concrete was poured in accordance with quality and 
design specifications. [Easmussen Deposition, p. 48]. 
Contrary to Appellant's assertion, Easmussen was not 
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a safety inspector and did not have authority to dictate 
construction procedures. [Easmussen Deposition, pp. 8, 
11-12]. If he observed unsafe practices, his duty and 
authority was limited to alerting the contractor or state 
inspectors. [Easmussen Deposition, pp. 11-12]. 
Approximately 20 minutes before the accident, Eas-
mussen testified that he became concerned because the 
boom of the crane appeared to be maneuvering too close 
to the power line. Easmussen expressed this concern to 
Brent Cox. Cox notified the crane operator to move the 
crane, which was done. [Easmussen Deposition, p. 24], 
Approximately 15 minutes later, Easmussen noticed the 
boom was again too close to the wire and he again noti-
fied Brent Cox. Cox requested Easmussen to advise the 
crane operator to move the boom away from the wire and 
Easmussen did so. [Easmussen Deposition, pp. 24-25]. 
Easmussen then returned to his truck to complete a test 
he was conducting. The crane operator did not move the 
crane, but continued the pour, intending to move it after 
he dumped one more bucket. [Easmussen Deposition, p. 
25]. 
Because the Appellant was injured in the course and 
scope of his employment with Cox Construction Com-
pany, he has received Workmen's Compensation pay-
ments incident to his injuries. 
The Appellant's claim against the State of Utah 
rests upon two claims. First, Appellant alleges the Indus-
trial Commission violated a duty imposed by Sec. 
35-1-16(1), U.C.A. 1953 as amended, to supervise every 
place of employment. Second, Appellant contends the 
5 
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Road Commission employee negligently failed to direct 
and supervise the construction work undertaken by Cox 
Construction Company. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the State of Utah because the Appellant failed to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court held 
that neither the Industrial Commission nor the Road 
Commission violated any duty upon which an award of 
damages can rest. Moreover, if any duty did exist, the 
Workmen's Compensation Act bars any recovery by this 
Appellant against the State. Finally, as a matter of law, 
the negligence of the Appellant's employer was the sole 
proximate cause of the accident. 
I , .. ' ' • • • : ' ' - • ' : ' 
i . ' • • / . • : • : ' • • : • • . ? . . . • > . " ; • ' 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE OF UTAH OWED NO DUTY 
TO THE APPELLANT UPON WHICH AN 
AWARD OF DAMAGES CAN BE BASED. 
A. The Industrial Commission's general duty 
to supervise places of employment and to enforce 
safety regulations cannot be the basis for civil 
liability. 
Appellant contends the State of Utah is liable for 
damages on the theory that the Industrial Commission 
breached a duty to supervise his employer and to enforce 
safety regulations. The Appellant relies on Sec. 35-1-
16(1), U.C.A. 1953 as amended, which states: 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It shall be the duty of the commission, and it shall 
have full power, jurisdiction and authority: 
(1) to supervise every employment and place 
of employment and to administer and 
enforce all laws for the protection of the 
life, health, safety and welfare of em-
ployees. 
In support of his contention, Appellant cites Peter-
son v. Fowler, 27 Utah 2d 159, 493 P.2d 997 (1972), where 
the Court held that an architect did not have a duty to 
insure that employees of contractors were furnished with 
a safe place to work. In dicta, the Court mentioned that 
such a duty lies with the Industrial Commission. 
Appellant cites no case where a general duty to en-
force laws for public health and safety has formed a basis 
for civil liability. Indeed, contrary to Appellant's con-
tention, it is well established that statutes imposing a 
general duty for the benefit of the public do not create 
any right or discernible standard of care upon which 
civil liability can be determined. 
In Kirk v. United States, 270 F. 2d 110, (9th Cir. 
1959), a case closely analogous to the instant suit, the 
court sustained a summary judgment for the defendant 
because no actionable duty to enforce safety regulations 
existed. In Kirk, plaintiffs brought an action under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act for wrongful death of a carpen-
ter who fell to his death from a scaffolding during con-
struction of a dam located on federal property. The de-
ceased was an employee of an independent contractor en-
gaged in the construction of the dam. The plaintiffs al-
7 
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leged the Army Corps of Engineers had a duty to enforce 
safety standards prescribed by Army regulations. The 
United States was represented on the project by inspec-
tors whose duty it was to see that the contractor complied 
with all safety provisions. When the plaintiff fell, there 
were no safety nets under the scaffolding and no ropes or 
buoys in or near the area as the safety standards re-
quired. As a result, the deceased plunged into the river 
below the work area. 
The Court rejected the argument that the plaintiffs 
had a civil remedy against the government merely be-
cause it had breached a duty prescribed by statute, regu-
lations, manuals and directives to conduct a continuous 
and comprehensive accident prevention and rescue pro-
gram. The Court held: 
The general rule is that a statute which does not 
purport to establish a civil liability, but merely 
makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of 
the public as an entity, is not subject to a con-
struction establishing a civil liability. 50 Am. Jur. 
582, Statutes, §586. 270 F.2d at 117. 
In Kirk, the statute under consideration did not de-
fine a degree of care imposed on the Army in the exercise 
of its general duty to promulgate and enforce safety reg-
ulations. In the absence of a legislatively defined stand-
ard of care, the Court correctly concluded that Congress 
did not intend to create a duty, the violation of which, 
could give rise to civil liability. The Court reasoned: 
Every Government employee must trace the duties 
of his job to some law, regulation, or order, but 
this does not mean that in every such case there 
is thereby established a duty of care on the part of 
8 
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the employee and the Government toward those 
who may be incidentally benefitted if those duties 
are properly performed, or toward those who 
may be incidentally injured if those duties are not 
properly performed. Id. at 118 (Citations 
omitted.) 
Similarly, in United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28 (10th 
Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 979, an action was 
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act for wrong-
ful death of an employee of Hercules Powder Company 
who was killed in an explosion at Bacchus, Utah, during 
experiments with solid fuel rocket propellants. The 
government engaged Hercules as an independent con-
tractor for research and development purposes in con-
nection with an experimental fuel. As in Kirk, govern-
ment officers were charged with the duty of overseeing 
the contractor to insure that it performed its duties in 
accordance with safety regulations. An Air Force officer 
who had the title of "Safety Engineer," was assigned to 
the project whose duty it was to "monitor" the contrac-
tor's safety performance. 
The trial court found that the government employees 
were negligent because they did not properly supervise 
the industrial safety practices of the contractor, did not 
prescribe additional safety practices and did not properly 
inspect the government property as to safety. The Circuit 
Court reversed the trial court decision with a direction 
to dismiss the case. The Court held that the safety regu-
lations imposed no duty upon the government which 
could be the basis of creating civil liability for injuries 
suffered by employees of the independent contractor. The 
Court stated: 
9 
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a Hercules had the primary responsibility for the 
safety of its employees; it had the direct control 
M;J and supervision over them, and they were work-
ing in its plant. Further, it had the duty to per-
form and supervise the individual functions, the 
total of which produced the end product. . . . It 
and the safety of those then working was under 
r
 the exclusive control and supervision of Hercules. 
The safety program of the government did not 
constitute an exercise of any such control. The 
fact that the activity may be dangerous has no 
consequences on this issue. 350 F.2d at 31. 
As in Kirk and Page, the statute upon which Ap-
pellant relies in the present case defines a mere gen-
eral duty for the benefit of the public as an entity. The 
statute does not impose a standard of performance upon 
which liability may be determined. In the absence of 
an expressed intention in the statute to create civil 
liability, and without a discernible standard of care im-
posed by legislative mandate, the statute cannot be con-
strued to grant individual employees a cause of action 
against the Industrial Commission. 
The importance of the distinction between a general 
duty to the public upon which civil liability may not 
be based, and a specific duty with a discernible stand-
ard of care is made apparent by viewing statutes analo-
gous to the one at issue in this case. Section 27-10-4, 
U.C.A., 1953 as amended, states that it shall be the 
duty of the State Highway Patrol to enforce the laws 
and rules and regulations of the State governing the 
use of the State highways. The presence of a highway 
patrolman to discover and abate every violation of every 
10 
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safety rule of the highway would clearly benefit motor-
ists. Nevertheless, a motorist injured by a speeding ve-
hicle may not maintain a right to recover damage from 
the State because a patrolman did not happen to be 
present to discover the violation in time to halt it. 
To the contrary, the primary duty to obey high-
way safety regulations lies with each motorist notwith-
standing the general duty of the Highway Patrol to 
enforce compliance. In the instant case, the actionable 
duty to provide a safe place of employment and to heed 
safety procedures lies with the employer and not with 
the Industrial Commission. 
In addition to recognized rules of statutory con-
struction, sound public policy requires rejection of the 
Appellant's argument. The statute upon which Appel-
lant relies charges the Industrial Commission with the 
general duty of supervising every employment and place 
of employment to enforce all laws for the protection 
of employees. If a specific duty arising by virtue of 
this statute is owed to each employee upon which lia-
bility may rest, the presence of an inspector would be 
required at the side of each employee on every single 
job. The legislature could not have intended to create 
a cause of action for failing to perform such an impos-
sible task. 
Finally, even if Sec. 35-1-16, TJ.C.A. 1953, as 
amended, sets forth a discernible duty of care to which 
the Industrial Commission is bound, subsequent provi-
sions of Utah law clearly limit the extent to which the 
11 
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State is liable to injured employees. Sec. 35-3-1, U.C.A. 
1953, as amended, establishes the State Insurance Fund 
as the exclusive means by which the State will be liable 
for employment related injuries. That statute expressly 
states: "There shall be no liability on the part of the 
State beyond the amount of such fund.'' 
Thus, if the Industrial Commission fails to exer-
cise the requisition degree of care in its enforcement 
of safety regulations, the State is liable only to the 
extent of Workmen's Compensation benefits. If the Ap-
pellant relies on a duty created by statute, the extent 
of the liability created thereby may also be limited by 
statute. The legislature has clearly done so in cases of 
this nature. 
Because the Appellant does not allege that the In-
dustrial Commission committed any acts of affirmative 
negligence, and, in any event, since his action is pre-
cluded by statute, he fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. Consequently, this Court should 
affirm the judgment of the court below. 
B. The State Road Commission owed no duty 
to the Appellant upon which liability may be based. 
In Utah, and throughout the country, courts have 
uniformly held that an employer is not liable for the 
negligence of an independent contractor that causes in-
jury to the contractor's employee. Prosser, Law of 
Torts, §70 (1964); Restatement of Torts 2d, §409; 57 
C.J.S., Master and Servant, §610 (1948). An employer 
12 
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owes to the servant of an independent contractor the 
duty to avoid endangering him by his own negligence 
or affirmative act, but owes no duty to protect him from 
the negligence of his own master. 
The general rule negating the Appellant's claim 
against the Eoad Commission in this case has long been 
recognized in Utah. In Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 
148 P. 408, (1914), the plaintiff, an employee of an in-
dependent contractor, brought suit against the owner 
of the property upon which the plaintiff was working 
pursuant to a subcontract agreement for construction 
of a tunnel. The plaintiff alleged that the owner of the 
property and the contractors for the project negligently 
overlooked a buried explosive which discharged injuring 
him. The owner of the property in its agreement with 
the contractor reserved the right to see that the work 
was done properly, but did not reserve the right to 
supervise, direct or control the methods or means by 
which the work was accomplished. Rejecting the plain-
tiff's claim against the employer-landowner, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
We think, therefore, that the case comes within 
the general rule that when a person employs a 
contractor to do work lawful in itself and involv-
ing no injurious consequences to others, and dam-
age arises to another through the negligence of 
the contractor or his servants, the contractor, and 
not the employer, is liable. We think the ruling 
right. 148 P. at 412. 
More recently, in Stevens v. Colorado Fuel and Iron, 
24 Utah 2d 214, 469 P.2d 3 (1970), an action closely 
analogous to the instant case, a suit was brought for 
13 
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wrongful death on the claim of a breach of duty to 
inspect and make safe places where men worked. The 
defendant was the owner of a mining claim who had 
contracted with the deceased's employer for the load-
ing of ore on the property. The plaintiff based his 
claim on the theory that the defendant had a duty to 
inspect work for safety and that this duty extended to 
employees of contractors. The Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint 
and said : 
Plaintiffs are confronted with a dilemma. If (the 
contractor) were an agent subject to the super-
1 ;
 vision and control of the defendant, defendant 
i would be an employer (Section 35-1-42, U.C.A. 
1953) and under Section 35-1-60, U.C.A. 1953, 
the compensation awarded under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act would be the exclusive remedy. 
If [the contractor 1 were an independent contrac-
1
 tor, the dangerous condition which allegedly 
caused Stevens' death would not be subject to the 
supervision and control of defendant. 469 P.2d 
at 4-5. 
The Appellant in the instant case is presented with 
the same dilemma. If he alleges that Cox Construction 
Company, his employer, was an independent contractor 
and thus the Road Commission was a third person 
against whom recovery may be sought, then, by defini-
tion, the State Road Commission could not exercise suf-
ficient control over Appellant's employer to be liable 
for its negligence in the performance of the construction 
work. On the other hand, in order for Appellant to sup-
port his claim that the Road Commission owed him a 
duty to inspect and supervise the work, he must con-
14 
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cede that Cox Construction Company was not an inde-
pendent contractor and thus his action is barred by 
Sec. 35-1-60, XJ.C.A. 1953, as amended, because Work-
men's Compensation is his exclusive remedy. 
The Appellant attempts to avoid this dilemma by 
claiming the Road Commission violated a duty that 
did not arise out of the employment relationship be-
tween the Commission and Cox Construction Company. 
Appellant argues that the Road Commission employee, 
Drew Rasmussen, assumed a duty upon which recovery 
may be based because he voluntarily attempted to warn 
the crane operator of danger. In support of this con* 
tention, Appellant cites Restatement of Torts, 2d, §§323 
and 324A, which states that one who undertakes to ren-
der services for the protection of another is liable when 
he fails to exercise reasonable care, if: 
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care w-
creases the risk of such harm, or 
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed 
by the other to the third person, or 
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of 
the other or the third person upon the undertak-
ing. 
The State does not challenge the validity of this 
"Hornbook tort law," but the undisputed facts clearly 
demonstrate that Appellant's theory is not applicable 
in this case. In any event, the legislature has barred 
any recovery on such a theory by making Workmen's 
Compensation the Appellant's sole remedy. 
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The Appellant does not allege that Road Commis-
sion employee Drew Rasmussen committed any affirm-
ative acts of negligence. Rather, Appellant contends 
Rasmussen should have either stopped the crane oper-
ator or continued his supervision of the operation of 
the crane. (Appellant's Brief, p. 24). At no time did 
Rasmussen ever "supervise" the operation of the crane 
or undertake to do so. By merely warning Brent Cox, 
and, at Cox's request, asking the crane operator to 
move the crane, Rasmussen clearly did not increase any 
hazard. He merely acted under Cox's direction. The 
undisputed facts also show that the operator failed to 
heed these warnings to move away from the wire and, 
therefore, no harm was suffered because of reliance 
upon Rasmussen's actions. Quite to the contrary, the 
Appellant was injured because his fellow employee failed 
to rely upon these warnings. 
Finally, if Rasmussen's actions were "undertaken 
to perform a duty owned by the other [employer] to 
the third person [employee]," Appellant's sole remedy 
is Workmen's Compensation. Sec. 35-1-60, U.C.A., 1953, 
as amended, states: 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to 
the provisions of this title for injuries sustained 
by the employee . . . shall be the exclusive remedy 
against the employer. . . . (Emphasis added). 
This Court has consistently and uniformly held that 
voluntary assumption of supervisory functions has been 
held to create an employer-employee relationship bar-
ring recovery irrespective of the prior relationship be-
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tween the parties. Sommerville v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 113 Utah 504, 196 P.2d 718 (1948); Parkinson v. 
Industrial Commission, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d 136 
(1946); Luker Sand and Gravel Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 82 Utah 188, 23 P.2d 225 (1933); Utah Fire 
Clay Co. v. Industrial Commission, 86 Utah 1, 40 P.2d 
183 (1935); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 12 Utah 2d 223, 364 P.2d 1020 (1961); Stevens 
v. Colorado Fuel and Iron, 24 Utah 2d 214, 469 P.2d 3 
(1970); Doyle v. Facilities, Inc., 29 Utah 2d 41, 504 P.2d 
1006 (1972). 
Consequently, since the Appellant's only theory of 
liability against the State Road Commission fails be-
cause no facts support its application and because lia-
bility is precluded by statute, the Court should affirm 
the judgment of the court below. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM AGAINST THE 
STATE OF UTAH IS BARBED BY THE 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. 
Appellant contends that the Industrial Commission 
and the State Road Commission violated a duty to pro-
tect him against any unsafe procedures employed by 
Cox Construction Company. Whether this alleged duty 
to protect him arises by statute or by voluntarily un-
dertaking to act for his benefit, the Appellant's claim 
is nevertheless barred by the Workmen's Compensation 
Act because the State of Utah would be an employer 
and its agents would be the Appellant's co-employees or 
supervisors within the meaning of the Act. 
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This Court has consistently held that the right to 
exercise control over the manner in which work is exe-
cuted is the hallmark of the employer's status within 
the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Any 
acts of negligence by State employees within the course 
and scope of their employment undertaken to control 
or supervise the construction work would be acts of the 
State in an employer capacity. 
Sec. 35-1-60, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, states: 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to 
the provisions of this title for injuries sustained 
by an employee . . . shall be the exclusive remedy 
against the employer. . . . (Emphasis added). 
The Workmen's Compensation Act defines "em-
ployer " in Sec. 35-1-42, as follows: 
The following shall constitute employers subject 
to the provisions of this title: 
(1) The State and each county, city, town 
and school district therein, 
* # # 
Where an employer procures any work to be 
done wholly or in part for him by a contractor 
over whose work he retains supervision or control, 
and such work is a part or process in the trade 
or business of the employer, such contractor, and 
all persons employed by him, and all subcontrac-
tors under him, and all persons employed by any 
such subcontractors, shall be deemed, within the 
meaning of this section, employees of such orig-
inal employer.... (Emphasis added.) 
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Consequently, if, as Appellant alleges, the State of 
Utah procured work to be done by the Cox Construction 
Company over which the State retained or exercised 
supervision or control, then the Cox Construction Com-
pany and all its employees, including the Appellant, 
were employees of the State within the meaning of Sec. 
35-1-42. If the Appellant is deemed an employee of 
this State, then his exclusive remedy is "Workmen's Com-
pensation. 
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Sommerville 
v. Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 504, 196 P.2d 718 
(1948): 
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the cru-
cial factor in determining whether an applicant 
for workmen's compensation is an employee or 
an independent contractor is whether or not the 
person for whom the services were performed 
had the right to control the execution of the work. 
196 P.2d at 720. 
To the same effect are: Parkinson v. Industrial Com-
mission, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d 136 (1946); Luker Sand 
and Gravel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 82 Utah 188, 
23 P.2d 225 (1933); Utah Fire Clay Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 86 Utah 1, 40 P.2d 183 (1935); Maryland 
Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 12 Utah 2d 223, 
365 P.2d 1020 (1961). 
The Appellant alleges that the Industrial Commis-
sion inspectors and the Road Commission personnel not 
only had the authority to dictate the manner in which 
the work of Cox Construction Company would be con-
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ducted, but also had the duty to do so. He urges that 
the State, through its Eoad Commission and Industrial 
Commission agents, should not have permitted the Cox 
Construction Company to pour cement under the power 
line with the assistance of a boom crane, should not 
have permitted the operation of the crane without an 
observer, and should not have continued work until the 
power line had been de-energized. 
It should be noted that operating a crane under a 
power line is permissible under the safety regulations 
promulgated by the Industrial Commission and the High-
way Department if ten (10) feet of clearance is main-
tained. Thus, the contractor could properly and safely 
operate the crane in connection with the pour if the 
minimum was maintained. ' ^ 
The authority to supervise the specific manner in 
which work was to be performed relied upon by the 
Appellant is the precise factor which precludes a re-
covery against the State. As the Court in Parkinson v. 
Industrial Commission, 110 Utah 309,172 P.2d 136 (1946) 
stated: 
It is when the employer cannot only determine 
*•* where the work shall be done but how it shall be 
executed that the relationship is that of employer-
employee. 172 P.2d at 140. 
Thus, the instant case is identical to that of Stevens 
v. Colorado Fuel and Iron, 24 Utah 2d 214, 469 P.2d 3 
(1970). In Stevens, the plaintiff was an employee of a 
contractor engaged in work on the defendant's prop-
erty. He claimed that the defendant had a "duty to 
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inspect and make safe the places where men work" and 
that the duty extended to employees of contractors. 469 
P.2d at 4. The Court held no relationship existed be-
tween the parties giving rise to an affirmative duty to 
protect the plaintiff because he was an employee of an 
independent contractor. The Court noted, however, that 
the plaintiff's cause of action was barred nevertheless, 
because, if the defendant had a duty to supervise the 
plaintiff's activity, the defendant became an employer 
and Workmen's Compensation was the exclusive remedy 
against him. 
The Appellant's claim is also barred as a matter 
of law because the actions of any State employee that 
may have contributed to the accident would have been 
undertaken as a co-employee and not as a third person 
against whom recovery may be sought. Since the plain-
tiff applied for and has received an award paid pur-
suant to the Workmen's Compensation Act, a suit may 
be brought only in accordance with (Sec. 35-1-62, U.C.A., 
1953, as amended, which states, in its relevant part: 
When any injury or death for which compensa-
tion is payable under this title shall have been 
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another 
person, not in the same employment, the injured 
employee . . . may also have an action for dam-
ages against such third person. (Emphasis add-
ed). 
In Peterson v. Fowler, 27 Utah 2d 159, 493 P.2d 997 
(1972), this Court set forth the guidelines for deter-
mining whether or not employees are engaged in the 
same employment within the meaning of Sec. 35-1-62. 
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In Peterson, the plaintiff's deceased was an employee 
of a general contractor killed when the scaffolding upon 
which he was standing collapsed. Plaintiff brought suit 
against an independent contractor that had negligently 
maintained the scaffolding claiming that the defendant 
was a "person not in the same employment." Affirm-
ing the trial court's summary judgment for the defend-
ant, the Court held that the relationship between the 
parties was such that they were fellow servants and 
thus persons in the same employment. The Court set 
forth the following test for determining when persons 
are in the same employment within the meaning of Sec. 
35-1-62: 
To be fellow servants, they must be engaged in 
the same line of work and labor together in such 
personal relations that they can exercise an in-
fluence upon each other promotive of proper cau-
tion and respect of their mutual safety. They 
should be at the time of the injury directly oper-
ating with each other in the particular business 
at hand, or they must be operating so that mutual 
duties bring them into such co-association that 
they may exercise an influence upon each other 
to use proper caution and be so situated in their 
labor to some extent as to be able to supervise 
and watch the conduct of each other as to skill, 
diligence, and carefulness. When workmen are 
so engaged, we think they are working in the same 
employment. 493 P.2d at 1000. 
The fact that the relationship between employees is 
merely temporary will not prevent them from being in 
the same employment, if the accident occurred while 
they were engaged in the same project. See, e.g., Barnes 
v. Wheeler Machinery Co., 520 P.2d 877 (Utah 1974). 
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In the instant case, Appellant argues that State 
employees had an opportunity to supervise and watch 
the conduct of the crane operator as to skill, diligence 
and carefulness and, yet, failed to exercise their influ-
ence upon him to use proper caution. But, as this Court 
recognized in Peterson* v. Fowler, supra, "When workers 
are so engaged they are working in the same employ-
ment" and all separate actions are expressly prohibited. 
493 P.2d at 1000. 
The Appellant's own contentions place this action 
squarely within the cagetory of cases barred by the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. Consequently, this Court 
should affirm the judgment of the Court below. 
POINT III 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF COX CONSTRUC-
TION COMPANY CONSTITUTES THE 
SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF APPEL-
LANT'S INJURIES. 
Appellant's claim against the State of Utah is 
founded upon the contention that the State passively 
stood by when the danger of contact with the high volt-
age wire became foreseeable. Even assuming the valid-
ity of Appellant's argument, the undisputed facts clearly 
demonstrate that the active negligence of the crane op-
erator constitutes the sole proximate cause of the ac-
cident terminating any passive negligence of the State 
of Utah as a legal cause of the accident. 
In Kimiho Toma v. Utah Power & Light Co., 12 Utah 
2d 278, 365 P.2d 788 (1961), this Court upheld a di-
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rected verdict dismissing the plaintiff's claim in a sit-
uation identical to the instant case. In Kimiko Torna, a 
workman was electrocuted when a crane boom made 
electrical contact with a power line during a cement 
pouring operation. The plaintiff sued the power com-
pany for failing to inspect the construction area and to 
either deactivate or remove the power lines. 
The Court recognized that the power company offi-
cials had a duty to keep themselves informed of the prog-
ress of the construction work because it was foreseeable 
that an accident could occur. Unless the possibility of elec-
trocution by contact with the wire could have been fore-
seen, no duty would have existed to inspect the prem-
ises and to alleviate the danger by terminating or insu-
lating electrical power for the cement pour. The Court 
stated: 
It was the duty of the defendant under existing 
circumstances to exercise a high degree of care 
to maintain its wires in such condition and in 
such a way as to avoid accidents. A high degree 
of foresight is required because of the character 
and behavior of electricity which it sells. 
It is our conclusion the Utah Power & Light Co. 
would have the obligation to keep themselves in-
formed generally of changing conditions and cir-
cumstances. 365 P.2d at 792. (Emphasis added). 
Notwithstanding the actual foreseeability of the dan-
ger of contact with the wire, the Court held that the 
subsequent active negligence of the crane operator by 
proceeding in the face of such a known danger is not 
legally foreseeable. Consequently, the passive negligence 
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of the power company was terminated as a legal cause 
of the accident because the subsequent active negligence 
constituted the sole proximate cause of the accident. 
Placing sole responsibility for the accident upon the con-
struction company, this Court stated: 
Thus, even though the Utah Power & Light Co. 
had negligently created a dangerous situation, 
and negligently continued to maintain such a con-
dition by refusing to cut off the power, the Moun-
tain States Construction Company did have 
knowledge of such condition and failed to avoid 
the impending disaster. On the contrary the Moun-
tain States Construction Company put into mo-
tion the actions which created the accident. Id. 
at 794. 
In the instant case, it is not disputed that the crane 
operator, as well as the construction supervisor on the 
site, had actual knowledge of the condition and failed 
to avoid the impending accident. On two occasions just 
minutes before the accident occurred, the crane operator 
was warned of the danger and was asked to move away 
from the wire. [Appellant's Brief, p. 7-8]. This is not 
a case where the construction company failed to dis-
cover the hazard in in time to avoid it. To the contrary, 
Appellant concedes that the construction company knew 
of the imminent danger posed by the high voltage line 
and, yet, inexplicably proceeded in disregard of the peril. 
It is that action that is legally unforeseeable and termi-
nates all prior passive negligence. 
Appellant attempts to distinguish Kimiko Toma by 
arguing that facts may exist supporting his belief that 
proceeding in the fact of such danger may have been 
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foreseeable. In so doing, he fails to recognize that, as 
a matter of law, and therefore irrespective of such facts, 
it is never legally foreseeable that a person having knowl-
edge of imminent peril will fail to avoid it when he has 
a reasonable opportunity to do so. 
The facts of the instant case clearly place the Ap-
pellant's claim squarely within the rule set forth in 
Komiko Toma. The trial court clearly did not err in 
holding, as a matter of law, that the State cannot be 
liable for the injuries suffered by this Appellant. Con-
sequently, this Court should affirm the judgment of the 
court below. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the summary judgment in 
favor of the State of Utah because the Road Commis-
sion and the Industrial Commission owed no legal duty 
to the Appellant, because the Workmen's Compensation 
Act precludes the Appellant's asserted claim and the 
negligence of the Appellant's employer constitutes the 
sole proximate cause of his injuries. 
Respectfully submitted, {i 
MERLIN R. LYBBERT 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS 
/Seventh Floor, Continental BankBldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent, State of Utah 
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